A-list political scientists Pippa Norris and Robert Inglehart have produced a fascinating account of the factors which transform societies from mass belief in religion towards a secular majority - and in the process attempt to explain why the USA has been the exception to this rule.
The article is published in the latest edition of Free Inquiry. While Europe and the USA differ in significant ways, with Europe heading towards a "post-Christian" society in only a few generations time, the trend in both continents is towards secularisation and more diversity. Norris and Inglehart recognise the challenge to the straight line of secularisation presented by continuing religiosity in the US, the rise of Islamic fundamentalism and the expansion of new age beliefs in Europe. So, is it time to bury the assumption of continued secularisation? This article argues an emphatic no:
"The critique
relies too heavily on selected anomalies and focuses too heavily on the
United States (which happens to be a striking deviant case) rather than
comparing systematic evidence across a broad range of rich and poor
societies.
We believe that the importance of religiosity persists most strongly
among vulnerable populations, especially those living in poorer
nations, facing personal survival-threatening risks. We argue that
feelings of vulnerability to physical, societal, and personal risks are
a key factor driving religiosity, and we demonstrate that the process
of secularization—a systematic erosion of religious practices, values,
and beliefs—has occurred most clearly among the most prosperous social
sectors living in affluent and secure post-industrial nations.
Secularization is a tendency, not an iron law...But when we go beyond
anecdotal evidence, we find that the overwhelming bulk of evidence
points in the opposite direction: people who experience ego-tropic
risks during their formative years (posing direct threats to themselves
and their families) or socio-tropic risks (threatening their community)
tend to be far more religious than those who grow up under safer, more
comfortable, and more predictable conditions. In relatively secure
societies, the remnants of religion have not died away, but the
importance and vitality of religion, its ever-present influence on how
people live their daily lives, has gradually eroded.
It is this point about individual and community insecurity that leads them to their explanation of the US exception:
"The strongest challenge to secularization theory arises from
American observers who commonly point out that claims of steadily
diminishing congregations in Western Europe are sharply at odds with
U.S. trends, at least until the early 1990s. Here we focus upon how we
can best explain “American exceptionalism.”...Evidence in Western Europe consistently and unequivocally shows two
things: traditional religious beliefs and involvement in
institutionalized religion, first, vary considerably from one country
to another; and, second, have steadily declined throughout Western
Europe, particularly since the 1960s. Studies have often reported that
many Western Euro¬peans have ceased to be regular churchgoers today
outside of special occasions such as Christmas and Easter, weddings and
funerals, a pattern especially evident among the young.
Trends in recent decades illustrate the consistency of the
secularization process irrespective of the particular indicator or
survey that is selected. All the trends point consistently downward.
Moreover, the erosion of religiosity is not exclusive to Western
European nations; regular churchgoing also dropped during the last two
decades in affluent Anglo-American nations such as Canada and
Australia.
One reason for the decline in religious participation during the late
twentieth century lies in the fact that during these years many common
spiritual beliefs have indeed suffered considerable erosion in
post-industrial societies.
Among post-industrial societies, the United States is the exception
in its combination of high rates of religious pluralism and
participation: the theory does indeed fit the American case, but the
problem is that it fails to work elsewhere.
What matters for the societal vulnerability, insecurity, and risk that
we believe drives religiosity are not simply levels of national
economic resources but their distribution as well.
Yet the level of economic inequality proves strongly and
significantly related to both forms of religious behavior, but
especially to the propensity to engage in individual religiosity
through prayer....the United
States is exceptionally high in religiosity in large part, we believe,
because it is also one of the most unequal post-industrial societies
under comparison.
Despite private affluence for the well-off, many American families,
even in the professional middle classes, face serious risks of loss of
paid work by the main breadwinner, the dangers of sudden ill health
without adequate private medical insurance, vulnerability to becoming a
victim of crime, as well as the problems of paying for long-term care
of the elderly. Americans face greater anxieties than citizens in other
advanced industrialized countries about whether or not they will be
covered by medical insurance, be fired arbitrarily, or be forced to
choose between losing their jobs and devoting themselves to their
newborn children. The entrepreneurial culture and the emphasis on
personal responsibility has generated conditions of individual freedom
and delivered considerable societal affluence, and yet one trade-off is
that the United States has greater income inequality than any other
advanced industrial democracy. By comparison, despite recent pressures
on restructuring, the secular Scandinavian and West European states
remain some of the most egalitarian societies, with relatively high
levels of personal taxation but also an expansive array of welfare
services in the public sector, including comprehensive healthcare,
social services, and pensions.
Growing up in societies in which survival is uncertain is conducive
to a strong emphasis on religion; conversely, experiencing high levels
of existential security throughout one’s formative years reduces the
subjective importance of religion in one’s life. As a society moves
past the early stages of industrialization and life becomes less nasty,
less brutish, and longer, people tend to become more secular in their
orientations. The most crucial explanatory variables are those that
differentiate between vulnerable societies and societies in which
survival is so secure that people take it for granted during their
formative years."
They conclude with a warning note about the implications of a world divided by "sacred" and secular societies growing further apart:
"Thus, while economic development brings systematic changes, a
society’s cultural heritage continues to influence cultural direction.
While secularization started earliest and has moved farthest in the
most economically developed countries, little or no secularization has
taken place in the low-income countries, meaning that the cultural
differences linked with economic development not only are not
shrinking, but are growing larger. This expanding gap between sacred
and secular societies around the globe has important consequences for
our current religious and political landscapes, our cultural change,
and our new forms of identity politics."
Recent Comments